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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
May Term 1940 
ADOLPH COORS COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, J. W. FUNK, HER-
BERT C. TAYLOR and HENRY 
JORGENSEN AS COMMISSION-
ERS OF THE LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants, 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
No. 6245 
This proceeding calls into question the powers of 
the Liquor Control Commission and is of state-wide im-
portance. The rights of the plaintiff are admittedly 
substantial and the damage it has and will suffer is sub-
stantial and incalculable. 
It is prayed that this Court, consistent with its pre-
vious practice in s~milar cases, assume jurisdiction of 
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the matter and determine and declare the rights of the 
p~rties hereto. 
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court has power 
to issue the writ of prohibition which is requested by 
this proceeding. Section 20-2-2 R. S. U. 1933 provides: 
''The Supreme Court shall have original juris-
diction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, pro-
hibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus." 
Part 1. THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME 
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THIS CAUSE: 
Pursuant to a request of this Court we will address 
ourselves to the question whether the Court should ex-
ercise its discretion for or against assumption of juris-
diction or remit the plaintiff to its remedy in the first 
instance to one or more district courts. 
This Court has many times assumed jurisdiction 
in similar cases in order to afford interested parties 
that plain, adequate and speedy remedy which the law 
contemplates. This case is one in which plaintiff's dam-
age accumulates constantly by the passage of time and 
for which there can be no recovery. It is urged, there-
fore, that to remit plaintiff to its remedy before the 
district courts will deprive it of the type of relief to 
which it is fairly entitled. 
It is significant that most if not all of the cases in-
volving a writ of prohibition in the State of Utah deal 
with original applications for the writ in this court. 
Applications for the writ have been and will no doubt 
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be relatively infrequent although much of the legislation 
creating administrative boards with quasi jurisdictional 
powers provides for a writ of review from this Court. 
Such is the case, for example, in the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act and in the laws relating to the Public 
Service Commission. Procedure for remedy and review 
is also contained in the Unemployment Compensation 
Act. There is, however, no appeal provided by law from 
the decisions of the State Liquor Commission. The Com-
mission is a part of the executive function of the State, 
and neither the Commission, nor its members, in the 
absence of fraud, would be liable for damages inflicted 
by the enforcement of an order even though the order 
be invalid and in excess of jurisdiction. We recognize 
the rule that this court has the right and the power to 
determine its own jurisdiction and would not be re-
quired in the exercise of a sound discretion to take juris-
diction of all applications for writs of prohibition if, in 
the opnion of the Court, a plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy would be afforded by ·requiring the applicant 
for the writ to pursue his remedy in the District Court. 
But it appears obvious from an examination of the facts 
and circumstances at bar that an application for a writ 
of prohibition or injunction in the district court would 
not afford the applicant speedy and adequate relief. 
It clarifies the question under present discussion to 
divorce it from the merits of the case for the moment 
and assume that the plaintiff is being deprived arbitrar-
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ily and capriciously and under a void order of ih; righ1 
to transport and sell beer in Utah in eight ounce bot 
tles. 
This is a valuable property right, the destructior 
of which can only be averted by actiou of this Court 
When and if the order is finally held to be in excess oj 
the jurisdiction of the Commission the applicant wil: 
have no remedy under which to recover the damage~ 
which it will have sustained. Therefore, the remedy tc 
be adequate must be speedy. The situation presentee 
requires a final determination of the validity of the or-
der at the earliest possible date. It would be unfair anc 
unjust to require the plaintiff to proceed by an applica-
tion for an injunction in the district court. If a prelim-
inary restraining order were issued such would requin 
of the applicant the putting up a bond even if the dis-
trict court should decide that it could restrain the en 
forcement of the order pendente lite, with the conse 
quent hazard of suits on such a bond by parties whc 
might claim to have been damaged by the non-compli 
ance with the order. 
Brewers in Utah who are distributing beer in bot 
tles of the capacity permitted under the order of th~ 
Commission would probably claim damages by reasm 
of the sale of beer in eight ounce bottles if it should h 
finally deter,mined that the order of the Commissi01 
were valid. This would result in a multiplicity of suit 
for damage and would be a hazard which no litigan 
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should be forced to assume where another speedy and 
adequate remedy is available. The proceeding in a dis-
trict court would involve the delay of an appeal to the 
Supreme Court before the question could be finally de-
termined. Apparently there is nothing in the law which 
would prevent the bringing of suits for the determina-
tion of the validity of the order in different district 
courts of the State at the same time, whose opinions 
might conflict, thereby making confusion more confused 
until the final determination by this court. 
A district court might well be reluctant to condemn 
a regulation of the Commission in the absence- of some 
controlling or guiding announcement from this Court, 
in which event it would pass the responsibility up to this 
Court. This plaintiff and all others similarly interested 
would then find themselves, after the long delay of in--
termediate litigation, exactly where they are at the mo-
ment. If it should then be ruled that the order com-
plained of is invalid the losses suffered by plaintiff, for 
which it has no recourse, would be to the extent of the 
delay irretrievably increased. 
The law gives to the district courts no special su-
pervisory power over the Commission. Assumption by 
this Court of jurisdiction in this matter would be con-
sistent and in harmony with the procedure now well es-
tablished by which this Court reviews the acts and or-
ders of practically all other administrative bodies. 
In Utah Association of Credit -Men v. Bowman 
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Judge, et al., 38 Utah 326, 113 Pac. 63, this Court took 
original jurisdiction of an application for writ of man-
damus against J. M. Bowman, Judge of the civil division 
of the city court of Salt Lake City, and against B. S. 
Rives, ex-officio clerk of such court, to compel entry of 
a default judgment by the clerk. The judge of the city 
court had ordered the clerk to refuse to enter a default 
judgment on the ground that the statute providing for 
such default judgment was unconstitutional. This court 
held th~t the clerk was performing a ministerial act in 
entering a default judgment and that mandamus was the 
proper remedy and granted the writ. 
''The Clerk, therefore, wrongfully refused to 
perform a legal duty and the Judge wrongfully or 
illegally refused to require the Clerk to perform 
such duty. In view, therefore, that the Judge has 
refused to compel the Clerk to act we must now do 
what the Judge ought to have done. It is there-
fore ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate 
issue against the Clerk requiring him to enter judg-
ment as prayed for in plaintiff's complaint filed 
in the action to which reference has been made in 
this opinion." (Page 339 of 38 Utah). 
In that case the district court had concurrent juris-
diction with this Court to issue the writ of mandamus. 
However, this court recognized that the question in-
volved was one of public concern and interest which 
required speedy and final determination in order to af-
ford the applicant an adequate remedy and in order to 
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establish a speedy clarification of the duties of the clerk 
of the city court. 
An interesting question and decision in point is re-
ported in State ex rel. Patterson v. Lee, 164 So. 188 
(Florida 1935). Florida had passed an act to license 
certain types of coin operative devices and providing for 
the division and distribution of the revenue derived 
therefrom. The act was administered by the defendant 
Lee as comptroller of the State of Florida. Prior to the 
filing of the application for writ of mandamus in the 
Supreme Court of Florida the circuit court in and for 
Dade County issued its injunction and restraining order 
restraining the defendant Lee from enforcing and ad-
ministering any of the powers, duties or privileges un-
der the act in question. The injunction in the circuit 
court was apparently based on the contention that the 
operation of a slot machine constituted a lottery. The 
defendant in the mandamus proceeding in the Supreme 
Court of Florida filed his answer setting up the injunc-
tion of the circuit court of Dade County as justification 
for a failure to enforce the act. The Supreme Court of 
~-,lorida held that the circuit court for Dade County did 
not have jurisdiction of the defendant comptroller be-
cause his duties were to be performed at the capitol of 
the state located in Leon County. The following quota-
tion from the case illustrates the point that the confu-
sion which would result if the applicant in the case at 
bar were required to seek an injunction in the district 
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courts of the State of Utah against the enforcement of 
an order of the Liquor Control Commission is a real and 
practical difficulty preventing such remedy from being 
adequate: 
"That suits instituted in the circuit courts to 
control or coerce the comptroller in the exercise of 
his administrative duties which are to be performed 
at the capitol of the state must be limited to the cir-
cuit court in and for Leon County in the second jud-
icial circuit of Florida is necessary; otherwise num-
erous suits could be instituted throughout the state 
of Florida in different circuits involving the same 
questions and different results and judgments con-
flicting in operation could be had against him at one 
and the same time in the several different judicial 
circuits of the state. This would bring about the 
possibilitiy of such confusion as to make it im-
possible for the comptroller to obey the mandate of 
one circuit court without violating that of another 
and would place him in position where it would be 
impractical to perform his official duties without 
appearing to be in contempt of the orders of one 
or more circuit courts. 
''For the reasons stated, the peremptory writ 
will be awarded.'' 
In the State of Washington, as in Utah, the law pro-
vides that both the Supreme Court and the Superior 
Courts have jurisdiction to grant writs of mandamuR 
and prohibition. In People ex rei. Harris v. Hinckle, 
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Secretary of State, ~:27 Pac. 861, the Supreme Court took 
original jurisdiction and issued its writ of mandate to 
prevent the Secretary of State from permitting the with-
drawal of signatures on initiative petitions which had 
been filed and was known as the so-called ' 'School Bill.'' 
The court said: 
"We have never refused jurisdiction in a case 
where a judicial officer or tribunal was attempting 
to exercise unlawful judicial acts, and it makes no 
difference what sort of officer or tribunal is at-
tempting to exercise such power." * * * * 
''We are therefore of the opinion that under 
the constitutional provisions conferring original 
jurisdiction upon this court to issue such writ, or 
at common law, the writ of prohibition would lie 
against this state officer to prevent such usurpation 
of power and unlawful exercise of a quasi judicial 
function. ' ' 
In Barnes v. Lehi City et al., 7 4 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 
878, this court took original jurisdiction of an applica-
tion for prohibition against Lehi City, its mayor and 
councilmen, to prevent them from entering into a con-
ditional sales contract with Fairbanks, Morse & Co. for 
the purchase and installation of a certain electrical gen-
erating unit with its accessories. The writ was denied 
on the merits. The court discusses the question whether 
the writ provided by our constitution and statutes 1s 
the writ known to the common law: 
''The true office and function of which is to 
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prevent an inferior tribunal, board or individual 
from exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions 
without quasi jurisdiction or whether it has been 
enlarged by our statutes to authorize the probiti-
tion of executive or ministerial acts without or in 
excess of jurisdiction.'' 
The court reviews Utah statutes and cases and holds 
that the writ provided by our statute authorizes the pro-
hibition of acts in excess of power or jurisdiction whether 
judicial or ministerial. It was contended that the Su-
preme Court should not grant the application for the 
writ of prohibition because plaintiffs had a plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy by injunction. Upon this 
question the court said: 
"As a general rule prohibition will not lie 
where the applicant has any other plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 
When there is another remedy the writ is not de-
mandable as a matter of right. The writ rimy, how-
ever, be issued in the exercise of a sound judicial 
discretion. The law on the subject, as now under-
stood, was stated by the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States in Re Rice, Petitioner, 155 U. S. at page 
402, 15 S. Ct. 152, 39 L. Ed. 198, as follows: 
"'Where it appears that the court whose ac-
tion is sought to be prohibited has clearly no juris-
diction of the cause originally, or of some collateral 
matter arising therein, a party who has objected 
to the jurisdiction at the outset, and has no other 
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remedy, is entitled to a writ of prohibition as a 
matter of right. But where there is another legal 
remedy by appeal or otherwise, or where the ques-
tion of the jurisdiction of the court is doubtful, or 
depends on facts which are not made matter of rec-
ord, or where the application is made by a stranger, 
the granting or refusal of the writ is discretion-
ary." 
The rule there announced was approved by this 
court in Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580, 40 
A. L. R. 230. 
''We recognize the importance of placing rea-
sonable restrictions upon the use of the writ of pro· 
hibition, and have no desire to encourage the prac-
tice of invoking the original jurisdiction of this 
court by resorting to these extraordinary remedies. 
This court has, however, in a great many of the 
cases cited by plaintiffs, entertained applications 
for writs in situations similar to the situation here 
involved. We think that the facts and circumst-
ances of this case justify us in entertaining plain-
tiff's application for the writ." 
The case of Atwood v. Cox, 55 Pac. (2d) 377, 92 
Utah 149, decided by this court in 1936, contains an ex-
haustive and penetrating analysis of the difficult ques-
tion of when the action of an inferior tribunal is in ex-
cess of its jurisdiction so as to justify a writ of prohibi-
tion and when such action is merely erroneous leaving 
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the aggrieved party to his remedy by the ordinary pro-
cesses of appeal. 
"In certain situations where it would work a 
palpable injustice or hardship or because damage 
which could not be checked or remedied in any 
other way, the Superior Court will not go too re-
finedly into the question as to what constitutes er-
ror merely or lack or excess of jurisdiction before 
issuing the writ. * * * 
''In a number of jurisdictions where a threat-
ened interlocutory or intermediate order involving 
some affirmative action of the lower court in ref-
erence to property, status, relationship, or rights 
of parties in respect to property was of such a na-
ture as to destroy the status quo and render an ap-
peal or other remedy ineffectual to undo the mis-
chief, the courts have issued the writ of prohibition 
as a 'fill-in' in order to prevent threatened mischief; 
most times not giving reasons therefore except to 
say categorically that the court below was threaten-
ing to exceed its jurisdiction or judicial powers or 
proceeding unlawfully or without legal warrant." 
Certainly any remedy which the applicant here-
in might have pursued in the district court to be effec-
tive would have destroyed the status quo with refer-
ence to the order of the Liquor Commission and an ap-
peal would have been ineffectual to undo the mischief 
or to prevent threatened mischief. 
It is1 significant to observe that this court in the 
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cases to be shortly discussed has taken jurisdiction of 
applications for writs of prohibition and has decided 
the question involved on the merits where the defend-
ants were public tribunals or political sub-divisions of 
the State of Utah without discussing or considering the 
propriety of exercising such jurisdiction. The situations 
presented to the court in these cases, which are similar 
to the question involved in the case at bar, obviously 
called for the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this 
court to afford a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 
The fact that ,the same relief could have been requested 
from the district courts was apparently not considered 
by any of the attorneys in these cases or by the couru 
itself as creating any question worthy of discussion 
upon the propriety of this court assuming and exercis-
ing its concurrent original jurisdiction. 
Moyle vs. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, et al, 53 Utah 352, 174 Pac. 198 was an applica-
tion filed in the Supreme Court for writ of prohibition 
against the Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County and the individual members thereof to prohibit 
them from holding a special election which had been 
called for the purpose of submitting to the qualified vot-
ers of said county the proposition whether certain bonds 
should be issued and the proceeds thereof devoted to the 
construction of certain specified public roads in said 
county. An alternative writ was issued and the defend-
ants appeared and filed what was in legal effect a gen-
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eral demurrer. The court considered the application on 
its merits and denied the writ. 
Hartley vs. State Road Commission, et al, 53 Utah, 
589, 17 4 Pac. 639 was an original proceeding in prohibi-
tion against the State Road Commission and Simon Bam-
berger and others as members thereof. The attorney 
general filed a general demurrer, and the court held on 
the merits that the defendants had not exceeded their au-
thority when they authorized the use of $50,000.00 de-
rived from certain bonds to be used on roads in Davis 
County. The court assumes, without discussion, the 
propriety of its exercise of original jurisdiction upon the 
application for prohibition. 
Booth vs. Midvale City, 55 Utah 220, 184 Pac. 799, 
was an application to the Supreme Court for a writ of 
prohibition against Midvale City and another to restrain 
the city from entering into a contract with the county for 
paving certain streets within the limits of the city. The 
application is considered on its merits and denied with-
out the point being raised or discussed that there was 
any question about the propriety of the Supreme Court 
exercising its original jurisdiction. 
Van Orton vs. Board of Education of Cache County 
School District, 56 Utah 430, 191 Pac. 230, was an ori-
ginal application for a writ of prohibition against the 
Board of Education of Cache County School District and 
others to prohibit them from issuing and selling bonds 
voted at a special bond election held in said District Feb-
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ruary 17, 1920. The case was considered on its merits 
and the application for writ of prohibition was denied. 
Cottrell vs. Millard County Drainage District, 58 
Utah 375, 199 Pac. 166, was an original proceeding in the 
Supreme Court against the Millard County Drainage Dis-
trict and others seeking to prohibit the defendants from 
offering for sale or selling certain bonds of the District 
in the sum of $150,000.00. The case was considered on 
its merits and the petition dismissed. 
Livingston vs. Millard County Drainage District No. 
3, 58 Utah 382, 199 Pac. 661, was an original application 
for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the defendants from 
delivering certain drainage district bonds and from com-
plying with the terms of a certain agreement entered in-
to between the district and a contractor. The applica-
tion was considered on its merits and the peremptory 
writ of prohibition issued. 
In McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 
85 P. (2d) 608, this court assumed original jurisdiction 
to test the validity of Mandatory Order No. 1 of the In-
dustrial Commission fixing minimum wages and hours 
and condition of employment for women and minors in 
the retail trade. There, as here, it might have been as-
serted that inasmuch as the district courts had concur-
rent jurisdiction with this court the parties should be 
remitted to the inferior court in the first instance. But 
the power of an administrative body exercising state-
wide authority was involved and this court, recognizing 
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the necessity of quickly determining and declaring the 
extent and limitations upon such power, assumed juris-
diction and settled the matter without the necessity for 
the delay which would have attended intermediate litiga-
tion in the district courts. 
Likewise State ex rei. Public Service Co·mmission 
v. Southern Pacifi cCompany, et al., 95 Utah 84, 79 P. 
( 2d) 25, this court exercised its original jurisdiction to 
consider an application of the State for a writ of man-
damus to require the defendants and others to file state-
ments with the Public Service Commission in accordance 
with the dictates of certain acts of th~ legislature com-
monly known as the Maw Bills. The powers and juris-
diction of the Public Service Commission were brought 
in issue and this court did not hesitate to take jurisdic-
tion and determine without delay the rights of the 
parties. 
So in Paramor Theatre Company v. Fair Trades~ 
Commission of the State of Utah, 95 Utah 354, 81 P. (2d) 
639, this court, appreciating the desirability of quickly 
construing, determing and declaring the rights of the 
Commission involved and the public affected, took juris-
diction and settled the question presented. 
In Tite v. Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404, 57 P. (2d) 
734, the Tax Commission had assessed a fine against a 
merchant of Ogden for violation of certain statutory pro-
visions requiring the affixing of revenue stamps to 
packages containing cigarettes. The merchant, feeling 
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aggrieved nd challenging the power of the Tax Commis-
sion to assess a fine in such cases and being unwilling 
to run the risk of delay in haYing his rights in the mat-
ter settled and determined, sought relief from this court 
by an application for writ of prohibition. Jurisdiction 
was assumed by this court and in accordance with its 
practice in such cases it disposed of the matter and set-
tled the rights of the administrative board involved with-
out remitting the parties to such rights as they might 
have had in the district court. 
The foregoing cases reflect a well established prac-
tice on the part of this court in cases involving the pow-
ers of administrative boards to exercise the original jur-
isdiction vested in it and give quick relief in the form 
of determinations and adjudications of powers sought 
to be exercised. 
Terrace v. Thompson, 68 L. Ed. 255, 263 U. S. 197, 
contains a scholarly exposition of the principles here un-
der discussion. While the precise question whether the 
Supreme Court should exercise its original jurisdiction, 
was not involved nevertheless the decision is particular-
ly applicable to certain aspects of the problem now fac-
ing us. The case arose in the State of Washington and 
tested the validity of an alien ownership statute of that 
state. A Washington landowner desired to lease his 
land to an alien who was denied the right by statute to 
own any interest in land. If a lease were made both par-
tiPs thereto violated the statute. The state threatened 
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prosecution of both parties if the agreement were en-
tered upon. The landowner sought relief in equity and 
the Supreme Court held it was a proper case for the in-
tervention of a court of equity. In speaking upon the 
subject the court said, in part: 
''The unconstitutionality of a state law is not, 
of its.elf, ground for equitable relief in the courts 
of the United States. That a suit in equity does not 
lie where there is a plain, adequate, and complete 
remedy at law is so well understood as not to re-
quire the citation of authorities. But the legal rem-
edy must be as complete, practical, and efficient as 
that which equity could afford. Boise Artesian 
Hot and Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 
281, 53 L, ed. 769, 798, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426; Walla 
Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U.S. 1, 11, 12, 
43 L. ed. 341, 346, 347, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77. Equity 
jurisdiction will be excercised to enjoin the threat-
ened enforcement of a state law which contravenes 
the Federal Constitution wherever it is essential, 
in order effectually to protect property rights and 
the rights of persons against injuries otherwise ir-
remediable; and in such a case a person who, as an 
officer of the state, is clothed with the duty of en-
forcing its laws, and who threatens and is about to 
commence proceedings, either civil or criminal, to 
enforce such a law against parties affected, may be 
enjoined from such action by a Federal court of 
equity. Citing cases. 
''The Terraces' property rights in the land in-
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elude the right to use, lease, and dispose of it for 
lawful purposes (Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 
74, 62 L. ed. 149, 160, L. R. A. 1918C, 210, 38 Sup. 
1Ct. Rep. 16, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1201), and the Con-
stitution protects these essential attributes of prop-
erty (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 391, 42 I. ed. 
780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383), and also protects 
Nekatsuka in his right to earn a livelihood by fol-
lowing the ordinary occupations of life (Truax v. 
Raich, 239 U. S. 33,-37, 38, 60 L. ed. 131, 133, 13:4i, 
L. R. A. 1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, Ann. Cas. 
1917B, 283; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. 
ed. 1042, :29 A. L. R. 1446, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625). If, 
as claimed, the state act is repugant to the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amend-
ment, then its enforcement will deprive the owners 
of their right to lease their land to N akatsuka, and 
deprive him of his right to pursue the occupation 
of farmer, and the threat to enforce it constitutes a 
continuing unlawful restriction upon and infringe-
ment of the rights of appellants, as to which they 
have no remedy at law which is as practical, effi-
cient, or adequate as the remedy in equity. And 
assuming, as suggested by the atttorney general, 
that, after the making of the lease, the validity of 
the law might be determined in proceedings to de-
clare a forfeiture of the property to the state, or in 
criminal proceedings to punish the owners, it does 
not follow that they may not appeal to equity for 
relief. No action at law can be initiated against 
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them until after the consummation of the proposed 
lease. The threatened enforcement of the law deters 
them. In order to obtain a remedy at law, the own-
ers, even if they would take the risk of fine, im-
pri~onment, and loss of property, must continue to 
suffer deprivation of their right to dispose of or 
lease their land to any such alien until one is found 
who will join them in violating the terms of the en-
actment and take the risk of forfeiture. Similarly, 
Nakatsuka must continue to be deprived of his 
right to follow his occupation as farmer until a 
landowner is found who is willing to make a for-
bidden transfer of land and take the risk of punish-
ment. The owners have an interest in the freedom 
of the alien, and he has an interest in their freedom, 
to make the lease. The state act purports to oper-
ate directly upon the consummation of the proposed 
transaction between them, and the threat and pur-
pose of the attorney general to enforce the punish-
ments and forfeiture prescribed prevents each from 
dealing with the other. Traux v. Raich, 239 U. S. 
33, 37, 39, 60 L. ed. 131, 133, 134, L. R. A. 1916D, 
545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283. They 
are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines, 
and imprisonment and loss of property in order to 
secure an adjudication of their rights. The com-
plaint presents a case in which equitable relief may 
be had, if the law complained of is shown to be in 
contravention of the Federal Constitution." 
And so here it would be m:;king- more thRn thP lf\w 
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required to demand that plaintiff, instead of invoking 
the power of this court, run the risk of criminal prosecu-
tion which would attend violation of the regulation com-
plained of. However strong one may be in his convic-
tion that a law or regulation is invalid he should not be 
required to hazard the results of proseou tion as long as 
a speedy and adequate remedy is available. And if 
plaintiff had itself been willing to violate the regulation 
and rely upon the invalidity of regulation as a defense 
to prosecution it could not have possibly made such de-
fense for all purchasers of beer in violation of the regula-
tion who would have been guilty equally with plaintiff. 
The foregoing makes it clear that this is a case in 
which this court should exercise its original jurisdiction 
in order that plaintiff may not be denied the plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy to which it is entitled. A 
discussion and consideration of the case upon its merits 
will conclusively confirm the case as one for the inter-
vention of this court's original jurisdiction. 
Assuming that the court will take jurisdiction, we 
will present the case upon its merits. 
PART 2. THE LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION IS 
NOT CLOTHED WITH AUTHORITY OR POWER TO 
MAKE AND INFORCE THE REGULATION 
COMPLAINED OF 
On April 7, 1939, the defendant Liquor Control Com-
mission made and published its purported regulation No. 
~0, which is in words and figures as follows: 
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''Governing Bottling of Beer and Regulation 
Size of Containers and Packages Used in the Dis-
tribution of Beer in the State of Utah. 
Section 1. (a) No brewer, wholesaler, manu-
facturer or dealer shall import, cause to be imported 
or receive or resell any beer within the State of 
Utah, except in the original container as prepared 
for the market by the brewer at the place of manu-
facture. 
(b) No brewer, dealer or wholesaler shall 
adopt or use in the State of Utah any container for 
beer differing in size from the following: 
11 oz. of beer whole barrels 
12 " " " half " 
22 " 
24 " " 
32 " " 
64 " " 
" quarter " 
" eighth 
" 
" 
Utah Liquor Control Commission 
By J. W. Funk, Chairman 
By Herbert Taylor, Commissioner 
" 
By Henry C. Jorgensen, Commissioner'' 
Thereafter plaintiff, in an effort to get relief from 
the Commission itself, requested a reconsideration and 
repeal of the order. In response to such request the 
matter was reconsidered, appearances were made and 
oral and written arguments presented. On November 
16, 1939, the Commission recorded its decision not to dis-
turb the order but to continue the same in full force and 
effect. 
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Plaintiff attacks the order as being beyond and 
in excess of the Commission's jurisdiction. The case is 
before the court upon plaintiff's complaint and defend-
ant's general demurrer. All matter properly pleaded in 
plaintiff's complaint is confessed by the general demur-
rer. Keyser v. Erickson, 61 Utah 179, 211 Pac. 698. Re-
sort will be had to the complaint for the facts which we 
contend are sufficient to require a ruling that the regu-
lation complained of is void as being in excess of the 
Commission's power and jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff is a brewing corporation of the State of 
Colorado and as such authorized and licensed to do busi-
ness within the State of Utah as an importer and whole-
saler of light beer. Plaintiff's beer is bottled in Colo-
rado and sold in practically all of the states surround-
ing the State of Utah in 8 ounce bottles. Plaintiff has 
expended large sums of money in equipping itself to 
sell light beer in 8 ounce bottles and has developed 
throughout the territory served by it a large consumer 
demand for its beer in such containers. 
Regulation No. 20, subparagraph (b), of which we 
complain, was adopted for the purpose of preventing 
plaintiff and others from selling light beers in 8 ounce 
bottles and from developing and acquiring a trade and 
business in such product. The regulation has been, is 
now, and will be enforced against plaintiff and others 
unlP;.:s the enforcement is prohibited by this court. The 
enforcement of the regulation has done and will work an 
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irreparable damage to the business of plaintiff for which 
there can be no recovery and for which there is no rem-
edy at law. 
By the general demurrer it is admitted further that 
the regulation complained of is "arbitrary" and "dis-
criminatory" and "bears no real or substantial relation 
to or does not promote or protect or tend to promote or 
protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare." 
Yet the defendant Commission will penalize violation 
thereof by a suspension of license or by fine or imprison-
ment or otherwise as in the Liquor Control Act provided. 
Specifically it is admitted that by enforcement of 
the regulation ''the loss to plaintiff of its respective in-
vestments, future profits and good will will be substan-
tial, incalculable and said loss will not be recoverable by 
any action at law." 
Admission of the facts pleaded forces the Commis-
sion to the position that however injurious to plaintiff 
the order may be; however arbitrary it may be and how-
ever unrelated it may be to public health, morals and 
safety, nevertheless, the Commission is clothed by the 
statute with such broad power that its jurisdiction in 
the matter is beyond successful challenge. This raises 
an issue of law which can, of course, find solution only 
by analysis of the Liquor Control Act. 
It will be unnecessary to cite authority in support 
of the general proposition that all legislative authority 
resides in the legislature or that such power rannot be 
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delegated to any administrative board. True, if the leg-
islature clearly defines the legislative purpose and pro-
vides well defined standards for carrying out such pur-
pose then the legisla1iure may safely and lawfully im-
pose upon administrative boards certain powers which 
may appear to be legislative. But the standards must 
be clear beyond doubt so as to leave, in fact, only admin-
istrative functions to perform. 
The power necessary to give validity to regulation 
No. 20 resides exclusively in the legislature and there 
is nothing in the statute which evidences any intention 
to delegate that power to the Commission. 
An inspection of the statute will disclose that while 
for some purposes the legislature treats "liquor" and 
"light beer" together as alcoholic beverages, yet for 
nearly all purposes involving details of control they are 
treated as being different. 
To begin with, the definition of "liquor" express-
ly excludes ''light beer.'' No liquor can be purchased 
or consumed within the state (railroad service excluded) 
unless it be liquor both purchased and resold by the 
liquor commission. Every detail of the acquisition, 
Htoreing and sale of liquor is under control of the Com-
mission and every cent of profit from the operation be-
longs to the state. 
The legislature, it may be assumed for the purpose 
of argument, might have fixed by statute the size and 
typP of containers in which liquor might be dispensed. 
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Because it had and has the power to prohibit the use of 
liquor at all if might fix the sizes in such measure as to 
effectively prevent the sale at all. But having conferred 
upon the Commission a monoply in the sale of liquor and 
having charged it with the responsibility of all details 
connected with the business it expressly conferred upon 
it the power of fixing by regulation the sizes of contain-
ers in which it would dispense liquor. We are not for 
the moment concerned with the question whether the 
legislature abdicated its legislative power in so doing. 
It is enough for the present that the legislature conferred 
no such power upon the Commission with respect of light 
beer. 
By section 6 (i) of the statute it is provided: 
'' ( i) Determine the nature, form and capac-
ity of all packages to be used for containing liquor 
kept or sold under this act. ' ' 
The foregoing demonstrates that the legislature gave 
the details here involved careful consideration and was 
in command of language apt to express its intention. If 
there had been any legislative purpose to confer the 
power necessary to give validity to regulation No. 20, 
subsection (b) the legislature was not without the power 
to clearly express the intent and purpose. It would haYe 
been simple to link the words '"and light leer" to the 
word "liquor" in the section quoted above (f jt could 
have substituted the words "alcoholie bevorages" for 
the word "liquor." 
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Or in the sections of the statute dealing with light 
beer it could have employed language equivalent to that 
employed with relation to liquor. But it did no such 
thing. The legislature was apparently willing to bestow 
upon the Commission the power to determine the sizes of 
liquor containers, but as to beer containers the legisla-
ture conferred no such power. It determined to occupy 
that field itself. By section 96 it provided: 
''Section 96. Receipt, Sale and Possession of 
Untaxed Beer Unlawful. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to import, 
receive, possess, dispense, sell, give, offer for sale, 
deliver, distribute, ship, transport or store or in any 
manner use, either in the original package or other-
wise, any beer unless the excise tax imposed by this 
act shall have been paid and unless a stamp or label 
showing such tax to have been paid shall be affixed 
to the barrel, bottle, or other immediate container 
of the beer; provided, that the commission may by 
regulation provide the conditions under which 
brewers licensed under this act may possess beer 
before the tax shall be paid thereon and the condi-
tions under which they may export beer from the 
state without the payment of the tax. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to keep, sell, or otherwise 
dispose of any bottled beer in containers of a cap-
acity of more than sixty-four fluid ounces, and shall 
be sold only in the original containers.'' 
The foregoing being all that is said by the legisla-
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ture upon the subject the only permissible inference is 
that beyond the restrictions there contained there are 
to be no further restrictions. If it be admitted for the 
moment that the legislature might have so encumbered 
the sale of beer by restrictions upon containers as to 
completely stifle such sale it by no means follows that 
the Commission has any such power. The sale of light 
beer is legalized expressly by the statute subject to cer-
tain regulation by the Commission. But the power to 
regulate as conferred by the statute is not the power to 
.. 
destroy. The power contended for by counsel in view 
of the admitted facts leads logically to the contention 
that the power of the Commission to regulate trade in 
beer is the power to prohibit entirely. 
The legislature has said only that glass containers 
shall not exceed 64 ounces of beer in capacity. If within 
that maximum the Commission may arbitrarily control 
the size of containers it logically follows that it can pro-
hibit entirely the sale of beer in bottles. 
''Where a line of business is to be supervised 
or controlled in whole or in part by a state agency 
(Fair Trades Commission of Utah) the legislatiYe 
enactment should by clear and decisive words indi-
cate the intent so to do, rather than to leave the 
power to depend on a judicial construction of doubt-
ful words.'' Paramor Theatre Co. v. Trad.e Com-
mission et al. 81 P. (2d) 639. 
By rule 20 the Commission outlaws all bottle ron-
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tainers except 11, 1:2, 22, :24, 32 and 64 ounces. Tomorrow 
it may outlaw the very sizes favored to the exclusion of 
all others by regulation 20; and by regulation provide 
that light beer may be sold only in bottles of one-half 
ounce capacity. If upon the facts here admitted com-
plaint of Regulation 20 is unavailing then a regulation 
limiting sales to bottles of one-half ounce capacity or 
any other size arbitrarily hit upon by the Commission 
would be invulnerable. That the Commission is clothed 
with some authority to make rules and regulations is not 
denied. Section 7 of the Act as amended provides: 
''The commission may, from time to time, make 
such resolutions, orders and regulations, not incon-
sistent with this act, as it may deem necessary for 
carrying out the provisions thereof and for its effi-
cient administration. The commission shall cause 
such regulations to be filed in the office of the Sec-
retary of State, and thereupon they shall have the 
same force as if they formed a part of this act. The 
commission may amend or repeal such regulations, 
and such amendments or repeals shall be filed in 
the same manner, and with like effect. The com-
mission may from time to time cause such regula-
tions to be printed for distribution in such manner 
as it may deem proper.'' 
The words ''not inconsistent with this act'' become, 
we think, very important in construing the authority 
and jurisdiction of the commission to make or enforce 
any regulation. 
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This court said in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 85 P. {2) 
831 wherein this question was involved: 
'It is a fundamental rule of statutory construc-
tion that the controlling purpose is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intention and purpose of the 
legislature. This intent and purpose is to be de-
duced from the whole and every part of the statute 
taken together. Roseberry v. Norsworthy 135 Miss. 
845, 100 So. 514 * * In the exercise of the rule mak-
ing power the commission must be guided by the 
intent and purpose of the legislature as found by 
a reading and interpretation of the whole act and 
every part thereof.'' 
The purpose of the act as stated in Section 2 is as 
follows: 
''This act shall be deemed an exercise of the 
police powers of the State for the protection of the 
public health, peace and morals to prevent the re-
currence of abuses associated with saloons to elimin-
ate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful manufac-
ture, selling and disposing of alcoholic beverages 
and all provisions of this act shall be liberally con-
strued for the attainment of these purposes. 
And its rule making powers as seen by a careful 
reading of Section 7 are limited to the regulations, orders 
and resolutions as it may deem necessary for carrying 
out the provisions thereof and for its efficient adminis-
tration. In other words, it may not enlarge upon the ex-
press purposes of the legislature but may only make such 
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rules as to efficiently administer those expressed pur-
poses. 
Section 83 of the Act provides as follows: 
"Beer may be manufactured, sold, delivered, 
distributed, bottled, shipped or transported or re-
moved for storage or consumption or sale within 
this state, or possessed or consumed therein or im-
ported into or exported therefrom in the manner 
and under the conditions prescribed in this act, or 
in the regulations, and not otherwise.'' 
The "condition prescribed by this act" must take 
precedence over any regulation made by the commission. 
It will be noted that beer is treated in the act under at 
separate article or chapter, being Article No. 5 and is 
expressly excluded from the definition of Liquor con-
tained in Section 3 as follows: 
"Liquor" means and includes alcohol, or any 
alcoholic, spirituous, vinous, fermented, malt, or 
other liquid or combinations of liquids, a part of 
which is spirituous, vinous, or fermented and all 
other drinks or drinkable liquids, containing more 
than one-half of one per centum of alcohol by 
weight; and all mixtures, compounds or prepara-
tions, whether liquid or not, which contain more 
than one-half of one per centum of alcohol by 
weight, and which are capable of human consump-
tion; except that the term "liquor" shall not include 
"light beer." 
''Alcoholic Beverage'' means and includes 
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''Beer'' and ''liquor'' as they are defined herein. 
Section 3, supra. 
And in furtherance of that distinction between liq-
uor and beer the legislature authorized the commission 
in Section 6 as follows: 
''Subject to the provisions of this act, the 
commission shall: 
(e) Control the possession, sale, transporta-
tion and delivery of alcoholic beverages in accord-
ance with the provisions of this act and the regula-
tions. * * * 
(i) Determine the nature, form and capacity 
of all packages to be used for containing liquor 
kept or sold under this act.'' 
Sub-section (e) is the only provision in Section 6 
referring to beer and Section 96 provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to import 
receive, possess, dispense, sell, give, offer for sale, 
deliver, distribute, ship, transport or store or in any 
manner use, either in the original package or other-
wise, any beer unless the excise tax imposed by this 
act shall have been paid and unless a stamp or label 
showing such tax to have been paid shall be affixed 
to the barrel, bottle, or other immediate container 
of the beer; proveded that the commission may by 
regulation provide the conditions under which 
brewers licensed under this act may possess beer 
BEFORE THE TAX SHALL BE PA[D THEREON 
AND TilE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY 
MAY EXPOR-T BEER FROM THE STATE WITH-
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OUT THE PAYMENT OF THE TAX. It shall be 
unlawful for any person to keep, sell or otherwise 
dispose of any bottled beer in containers of a cap-
acity of more than sixty-four fluid ounces, and shall 
be sold only in the original containers.'' 
This Honorable Court said in Bird & J ex v. Funk, 
supra: 
''The declared general purposes of the Liquor 
Control Act, under which the Liquor Commission 
derives its authority are ''for the protection of the 
public health, peace and morals; to prevent the re-
currence of abuses associated with saloons; to eli-
minate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful manu-
facture, selling and disposing of alcoholic bever-
ages * * * '' 
And this court further said: 
"Where the legislature delegates to an admin-
istrative agency power to make rules and regula-
tions, such delegation must be accompanied by a 
declared policy outlining the field within which 
such rules and regulations may be adopted.'' Citing 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 55 
S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947; Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 
79 L. Ed. 446; State v. Goss, 7·9, Ut. 559, 11 P (2) 
340. From this it must necessarily follow that all 
rules and regulations adopted by an administrative 
board or agency must be in furtherance of and fol-
low out the declared policies of the legislative en-
actment. If the regulations or rules are in excess 
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of the declared purposes of the statute they are in-· 
valid." State v. Goss, supra, Utah Manufacturers 
Assn. v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198 23 P. (2) 229. 
That the Legislature originally gave the Commis-
sion broad powers is not denied. But that they did not 
intend to give (even if that were possible which we sub-
mit was not) complete and arbitrary power on the part 
of the Commission to regulate the sale of light beer or 
to prohibit the same is evidenced by Section 29, Chapter 
43, Laws of Utah 1935 which reads as follows: 
''Every action, order or decision of the Commis-
sion as to any matter or thing in respect of which 
any discretion is conferred on the Commission un-
der this act shall be final and shall not be ques-
tioned, reviewed or restrained by injunction, pro-
hibition or mandamus or other process or proceed-
ing in any court or be removed by certiorari or 
otherwise to any court EXCEPT IN THE CASES 
IN WHICH FRAUD OR EXCESS OF JURISDIC 
TION IS CLAIMED.'' 
But even from the powers and authority granted the 
Commission by the 1935 Act there was withdrawn in 
Chapter 49, Laws of Utah, 1937 the power to grant li-
censes to sell light beer at retail and on draught and giv-
ing that power to the cities and towns. Section 89, Chap· 
ter 50, Laws of U',tah 1937. In Section 103 the act pro· 
vides for tax stamps to be affixed for containers of cap-
acity other than the capacities mentioned in the act and 
provides: 
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''And if stamps are not provided by law or in 
the discretion of the Tax Commission of denomina-
tions accurately adapted for the payment of the 
tax on the maximum capacity of the container then 
the stamp adapted for the payment of the tax on 
the container of the next higher capacity." 
recognizing the right to sell beer in containers of any 
capacity under 64 fluid oz. so long as the tax was paid. 
Section 104 as amended in Chapter 50, Laws of Utah 
1937 provides for labels, caps and stamps to be used on 
containers without restriction as to capacity. We may all 
disagree as to the advisability of the Legislature re-
stricting the powers of the commission over the control 
of light beer, but as Jus1tice Wolfe stated in his dissent-
ing opinion in the case of Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 85 Pac. 
(2) at page 837, 
"If the legislature detracted from the salutary 
purposes of the act it must stand responsible to 
the people. The courts cannot by forced construc-
tion serve those purposes to the people against the 
expressed will of the legislature.'' 
Having in mind that the legislature contented itself 
upon the subject of size and capacity of bottles by pro-
hibiting the use of bottles of more than 64 ounces a read-
ing of Tite v. Tax Commission, supra, will make it clear 
that the order now complained of is void. In the Tite 
case this court reviewed a tax statute which provided 
that for violation of certain provisions a person became 
subject to a fine of not more than $299.00 or less than 
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$10.00. The Tax Commisswn, being charged with the ad-
ministration of the law, found a violation and assessed a 
fine of $250.00. This court condemned the assessment of 
the fine and in the course of its opinion said: 
"In this case, the Legislature gave the tax com-
mission not only power to hear and det:ermin~ 
whether a penalty should attach, but within the 
limits of from $10 to $299 to fix the penalty. The 
commission fixed it at $250. This involved not only 
the function of determining whether a situation was 
such as would work an imposition of the penalty 
fixed or ascertainable by law and the function of 
imposing such penalty, but the function and power 
of determining the amount of the penalty. This 
involves not the question of whether the Legisla-
ture gave the taxe commission a judicial rather 
than an administrative power (unless we accept 
the plaintiffs' contention that this power to deter-
mine the arrnount of the penalty is really fixing pun-
ishment for a crime), but the question of whether 
the Legislature could delegate such power to deter-
mine the amount, in its discretion, to any tribunal 
as a matter of penalty imposed not as punishment 
for a crime but as a sanction to pay the tax. We 
think it could not do so. Giving to the tax rommis-
sion the power to determine in its own judgment 
the amount of the penalty was a legislative funetion 
which could not be delegated. It iR not the power 
to enforce or apply a law, but the power to mRke a 
law for each particular case, to determine in itR 
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judgment the amount of a penalty. We recognize 
the power to make reasonable rules and regulations 
and to make a failure to obey them involve a loss 
of rights either given by law or by the regulations 
themselves. But in this case there was no basis pro-
vided for the commission to ascertain the amount 
of the penalty by a mathematical computation, but 
the broad power to determine its amount within its 
discretion, from $10 up to $299.'' 
Here the legislature has said it shall be unlawful to 
employ bottle containers of more than 64 ounces. The 
Commission has passed a law that a crime is committed 
when an eight ounce bottle is used. If the assessment of 
a fine by the Tax Commission at a sum between $10.00 
and $299.00 was making a law then most certainly the 
Liquor Commission was making a law when it declared 
it to be a public offense to sell beer in 8 ounce bottles. 
If the Commission may pass a law forbidding the 
purchase or sale of light beer in 8 ounce bottles there is 
nothing in the way of its declaring it unlawful for a dis-
penser of beer to draw less than eleven ounces of beer 
into a glass to serve his customer. A step further in the 
same direction leads to the inquiry whether if a customer 
can purchase no less than eleven ounces of beer he shall 
be required to consume all he buys. If a customer can} 
buy as much or little beer as he desires from a tap why 
must he be forced to buy more than he wants in a bottle. 
SUMMARY 
From what has been set down before it has been 
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made clear that this court has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter upon its merits and to determine and adjudge the 
rights of th~ parties. Possessing the necessary jurisdic-
tion the court will exercise the same whenever necessary 
to provide that plain, speedy and adequate remedy which 
is the right of all persons whose rights are invaded or 
threatened with invasion. 
The case involves the exercise by an administrative 
board of challenged powers and this court, recognizing 
the advantage to the public of an early settlement of 
such disputes, has rarely declined jurisdiction in such 
cases. It is in the public interest to have disputes testing 
the powers of administrative bodies quickly and finally 
settled. 
Furthermore, it is admitted here that plaintiff is 
possessed of substantial rights which are invaded by the 
enforcement of the order complained of; and that there 
can be no recourse for the damage suffered by such in-
vasion if finally it shall be ruled that the regulation is 
void. The order admittedly does not promote the health, 
safety or morals of the public but it is claimed that the 
Commission has the power to make and enforce the regu-
lation throughout the State. The situation not only jns-
tifies but invites the assumption and exercise of jurisdic-
tion. 
Upon the merits of the case it will appear tbat the 
pommission has invaded a field never opened to it h~· 
the legislature. It has assumed, without n•lation to the 
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declared purposes of the net, the power and authority to 
legislate upon the size and capacity of light beer con-
tainers. If such power be confirmed in the Commission 
it will be at liberty to conYert the power of regulation 
into the power of prohibition. If the Commission can out-
law the sale of beer in an 8 ounce bottle it may outlaw 
the sale of beer in any bottle at all and thereby suspend 
and prohibit a trade and business expressly legalized by 
the legislature. Certainly there is nothing in the statutes 
from which any such power may be implied. 
To the end that the plaintiff may enjoy that plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy to which it is entitled it is 
respectfully submitted that the court should -take juris-
diction of the controYersy and upon a review of the order 
it should declare the same to be void and of no effect. 
Respectfully submitted 
IRA A. HUGGINS 
PAUL H. RAY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Petitioner 
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